RJR Nabisco leveraged buyout: The story of one of the biggest deals ever
- admin1351600
- Mar 25
- 18 min read
In late 1988, the leveraged buyout of RJR Nabisco became a symbol of Wall Street’s boom-and-bust era of the 1980s. The $25 billion deal – the largest LBO in history at the time – pitted a free-spending CEO against aggressive private equity buyers in a dramatic bidding war. What unfolded was a saga of corporate power plays fuelled by junk bond financing, set against the backdrop of a frenzied 1980s takeover boom.
RJR Nabisco Pre-LBO
RJR Nabisco was formed in 1985–1986 when tobacco giant R.J. Reynolds (maker of Winston and Camel cigarettes) merged with Nabisco Brands, a leading consumer foods company known for Oreo cookies and Ritz crackers. This merger created a diversified conglomerate with both a tobacco business (R.J. Reynolds Tobacco) and a food business (Nabisco). The combined firm’s products ranged from cigarettes to snacks and even pet foods (Milk-Bone dog biscuits). F. Ross Johnson, who had been CEO of Nabisco, became CEO of the merged RJR Nabisco in 1987. Johnson was known for his charismatic yet free-spending management style – epitomized by perks like a corporate fleet of jets – which later made him a target of criticism in the press. Under his leadership, RJR Nabisco relocated its headquarters from Winston-Salem, NC to Atlanta, reflecting Johnson’s view that the company needed a flashier, “world-class” image.
At the end of the 1980s, RJR Nabisco was the 19th largest industrial company in the world, with stable, if unspectacular, financial results. Notably, the tobacco division provided robust cash flow with high margins, while the food division offered slower growth but stable profits. This mix of businesses made RJR Nabisco attractive to buyout firms: tobacco provided strong, predictable cash generation (useful for servicing debt), and the food brands offered potential break-up value for a buyer looking to sell off pieces of the conglomerate.
By 1988, RJR Nabisco’s stock price had been languishing prior to buyout talks, despite its solid profits. In fact, in early 1988, Ross Johnson had authorized a $1.1 billion stock buyback to prop up the share price. The boost proved temporary – after the buyback, the stock drifted down again, reflecting investor scepticism about the conglomerate’s prospects. RJR’s return on assets had been declining (11.5% in 1988, down from 15.5% in 1985) and management’s heavy spending drew criticism. Johnson grew concerned that the company’s depressed stock made it a ripe target for a hostile corporate raider, at a time when raiders like Carl Icahn and Ronald Perelman prowled for undervalued companies.
As 1988 progressed, Johnson began to consider a radical solution: a management-led leveraged buyout of RJR Nabisco. Such a move would take the company private, presumably allowing its businesses to be restructured away from Wall Street’s short-term pressures – and rewarding Johnson and his management team with significant equity stakes. However, a management buyout would also saddle RJR with enormous debt. Johnson initially saw an LBO as a defensive move to prevent outside raiders from seizing control. By October 1988, he had quietly enlisted investment bankers from Shearson Lehman Hutton to craft a buyout proposal before any outsider could swoop in. This set the stage for what would become a milestone in corporate finance lore.
The LBO Boom of the 1980s
A leveraged buyout (LBO) is the acquisition of a company using a significant amount of borrowed money (leverage) to finance the purchase. In a typical LBO, a small group of investors (such as a private equity firm and/or management) contributes a portion of equity and borrows the rest, often using the target company’s assets and future cash flows as collateral. The goal is to improve the company’s performance (or break it up and sell parts) so that its cash flow can service the high debt load and eventually generate a return for the investors far above their initial equity outlay. LBOs thrive on the principle that debt can amplify returns – but this comes with high risk if the company’s cash flow falters. The concept of the LBO gained significant attention in 1982 with the acquisition of Gibson Greetings, a greeting card company. A group of investors, led by Wesray Capital Corporation, put up $1 million in equity, borrowed $79 million, and purchased the company for $80 million. Just 18 months later, they sold Gibson Greetings for $290 million, generating an enormous profit that showcased the power of LBOs. This deal, often considered the catalyst for the 1980s buyout boom, demonstrated how high leverage and minimal equity investment could lead to outsized returns. It also paved the way for the rise of junk bonds as a primary financing tool for LBOs, allowing even larger transactions to be executed throughout the decade.
The early-to-mid 1980s witnessed a dramatic surge in LBO activity, fuelled in large part by the advent of junk bonds – high-yield bonds used to raise vast sums for corporate takeovers. Investment banker Michael Milken of Drexel Burnham Lambert pioneered the junk bond market, which provided buyout firms with readily available debt financing for acquisitions that traditional banks might deem too risky. With junk bonds, acquirers could finance multi-billion-dollar takeovers of well-established companies with relatively little equity. This innovation spurred a wave of ever-larger LBOs. By the late 1980s, deal size kept escalating: for example, KKR’s $6.2 billion buyout of Beatrice Companies in 1985 was then the largest ever.
Investment banks and specialized buyout firms eagerly rode this wave. Firms like KKR (Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co.), Forstmann Little, and Wesray became household names in finance. Henry Kravis of KKR, in particular, became an emblematic figure of the LBO boom – a hard-driving dealmaker focused on acquiring underperforming conglomerates and unlocking value. Firms like KKR specialized in taking companies private and often breaking them up: the rationale was that many 1970s-era conglomerates had disparate businesses whose separate values exceeded the company’s combined market value. By buying the whole company through an LBO, the pieces could be sold off for profit, while aggressive cost-cutting would improve operating earnings. In RJR’s case, analysts saw both “significant break-up value” in selling brands and fixable inefficiencies in the company’s operations.
The RJR Nabisco buyout unfolded in a fevered M&A environment. Despite the stock market crash of October 1987, which temporarily chilled financing markets, merger activity came roaring back in 1988. In fact, 1988 set new records for deal-making. Through the first ten months of 1988, 215 LBOs worth $35.7 billion were completed in the U.S., comprising roughly 23% of all M&A value in that period. Overall U.S. merger activity hit all-time highs by dollar volume in 1988. Companies that just a year earlier saw their stock prices plunge in the Black Monday crash now found themselves subject to buyout offers as valuations rebounded at cheaper levels than before. Crucially, interest rates remained moderate, and lenders/investors were still willing to fund big deals – although cracks were beginning to show in the junk bond market by late 1988. Drexel Burnham (the engine of junk bond financing) was under investigation and would collapse by early 1990 amid the Miachel Milken scandal. But in 1988, credit was still flowing freely enough for a “mega-buyout” like RJR Nabisco to be conceivable.
Another factor was the increasingly aggressive role of corporate executives and private equity firms in driving deals. After seeing raiders launch hostile takeovers throughout the 1980s, many corporate boards and CEOs started to initiate buyouts of their own companies (so-called management buyouts, MBOs) to pre-empt outside takeovers. RJR’s situation was a prime example: Ross Johnson decided to lead an MBO rather than risk someone like Icahn or Kravis doing it without him. Additionally, by 1988, the fees and profits from these deals were enormous, attracting every major Wall Street player into the fray.
The Bidding War
The takeover fight for RJR Nabisco officially kicked off in October 1988. Ross Johnson, with financial backing from Shearson Lehman Hutton (owned by American Express), proposed a management buyout at $75 per share, equivalent to roughly $17 billion for the company. This offer represented a significant premium of 33% over RJR’s then-trading stock price (around $56) and would be financed primarily with debt. Johnson’s bid also came with striking terms for himself and his management team: they sought to retain 20% of the company’s equity post-buyout (worth potentially billions in the future) while contributing none of their own cash. In essence, Johnson was asking the board to let him and a select group of insiders take control of RJR Nabisco with other people’s money – an arrangement that would richly reward them if the company prospered privately.
When news of the offer reached RJR’s board of directors, it was met with shock and indignation. The board viewed their own CEO as a surprise “black knight” emerging from within. Sensing both a conflict of interest and the possibility of higher bids, the directors rejected Johnson’s $75/share proposal and announced that RJR Nabisco was now “in play” – effectively inviting other bidders to top the management’s offer. The auction for RJR Nabisco had begun, setting off a frenzy on Wall Street. As Bryan Burrough and John Helyar later chronicled in Barbarians at the Gate, once the news went public it created “a bidding war that would eventually push the price for RJR Nabisco to $25 billion.” Nearly every major investment bank and private equity outfit of the era scrambled to assemble a buyout consortium and pitch a deal to RJR’s board.
Over a six-week period in October and November 1988, a series of escalating bids were made for RJR Nabisco. Behind the scenes, each side maneuverer furiously to gain an edge. KKR’s tactic was to lock up Wall Street’s support: Kravis recruited virtually every major investment bank and law firm he could, aiming to deny the management group access to financing and advisors (KKR even dubbed it the “get them all” strategy). Meanwhile, a surprise third bidder emerged. In late November, Forstmann Little, a rival buyout firm led by Ted Forstmann, joined with First Boston to propose a last-minute offer of $118 per share – a so-called “white knight” bid that briefly outshone both KKR and management’s proposals. RJR’s board extended the bidding deadline to evaluate this stunning offer. However, the First Boston/Forstmann bid proved to be highly complex and conditional. It involved an unusual plan to buy RJR’s food business with instalment notes, pre-arrange the sale of assets (to companies like Procter & Gamble and Ralston Purina), and then acquire the tobacco business with the proceeds. Crucially, the $118 offer wasn’t fully financed – it depended on further review of RJR’s confidential data and commitments from the would-be asset buyers. When it became clear that the First Boston bid lacked firm backing, it effectively collapsed – but not before forcing the other contenders to raise their bids yet again.
In the final round of the auction (November 29, 1988), Johnson’s team upped its bid to $101, and KKR countered at $109 a few days later. By now, many on the RJR board (and among RJR’s shareholders) had soured on Johnson, perceiving that his focus on winning the company was as much about ego and control as shareholder value. Johnson nonetheless made one last push – he submitted a $112 per share bid, comprised of $84 in cash and $28 in securities.
In an extraordinary climax, the board did not choose the highest price. After intense deliberations, RJR Nabisco’s directors voted to accept KKR’s $109 per share offer and to reject Johnson’s $112. It was a shocking outcome given the nominal price difference, but the board cited qualitative reasons for favouring KKR. The special committee felt that KKR’s financing was more secure and would require less “gutting” of the company to meet debt payments, whereas the management group’s bid relied on aggressive assumptions and potentially risky junk bonds that could jeopardize RJR’s future. In short, KKR’s offer was seen as more certain to close and slightly more conservative in its use of leverage, which meant RJR might survive the LBO in better shape. Some observers also viewed the decision as the board’s final rebuke of Ross Johnson’s conduct (the board was still incensed that Johnson had tried to engineer a buyout for himself in the first place). In the meantime, the agreement for the management of Ross Johnson has been revealed to the press, which has completely disgusted the company's board and deeply shocked American public opinion. Time magazine captured the public sentiment in late 1988 with a blunt cover headline about Ross Johnson: “A Game of Greed: This man could pocket $100 million from the largest corporate takeover in history. Has the buyout craze gone too far?”.
The RJR board defined its fiduciary duty broadly – considering not just immediate shareholder payout but also the welfare of employees and communities – and it was willing to accept a marginally lower price to uphold those interests. KKR’s victory was sealed. The final buyout price of $109 per share translated to roughly $25 billion in total value, shattering records for the largest LBO ever. The deal closed in early 1989, ending RJR Nabisco’s four-decade run as a public company. Shareholders walked away with enormous gains. Ross Johnson was quickly ousted by the new owners, despite negotiating a golden parachute worth $53 million before tax on his departure, at that time a record-breaking CEO severance package. In the aftermath, journalist Bryan Burrough quipped that Johnson “lost the company but won the lottery”. For Henry Kravis and KKR, winning RJR Nabisco was a career-defining coup, immortalizing them (for better or worse) as the “barbarians at the gate”.
The Aftermath: RJR Nabisco post-LBO
KKR’s takeover left RJR Nabisco saddled with an eye-popping $26 billion debt on its balance sheet. Servicing this debt (interest and principal repayments) instantly became the company’s overriding financial concern. RJR’s interest expense and debt expense ballooned from $549 million in 1988 to $3.38 billion in 1989 – money that previously went to dividends, R&D, and marketing now had to go toward debt payments.
To generate cash, KKR and the new RJR management team (led by CEO Louis V. Gerstner, Jr., whom KKR installed in 1989) moved quickly to streamline operations and sell off non-core assets. Within the first year, thousands of jobs were cut, and executive perks were slashed – the era of country club excess at RJR was definitively over. The company also began divesting divisions to raise cash. Notably, in 1990 RJR Nabisco sold its international tobacco operations (e.g. overseas rights to the Camel and Winston brands) to Japan Tobacco for approximately $4 billion. Other smaller businesses and brands were auctioned off as well, with proceeds used to chip away at the massive debt load.
Despite these measures, RJR Nabisco struggled under its LBO burden. The early 1990s brought unexpected headwinds: a price war erupted in the U.S. cigarette market as tobacco companies slashed prices to compete, while new lawsuits and regulatory pressures on tobacco continued to mount. With its finances constrained, RJR Nabisco could not freely increase marketing or R&D spending to defend its market share. Competitors like Philip Morris, which remained public and financially stronger, could outspend RJR on promotions and product development. As a result, RJR’s tobacco revenues and margins began to lag, undermining the very cash flows that were supposed to support the LBO structure. The tobacco business turned out not to be as good a cash cow as the buyers had expected, because RJR Nabisco had virtually no financial flexibility to respond to competitive moves due to its high debt payments.
KKR and RJR’s management responded by doubling down on deleveraging. Throughout 1990–1991, the company used every available dollar of operating cash flow (and the proceeds from asset sales) to pay down chunks of debt. By 1990, RJR Nabisco’s total debt had been reduced by several billion dollars from its peak, easing some pressure. In 1991, KKR took RJR Nabisco public again, issuing about 19% of the company’s equity in a new stock offering to further raise capital and lighten the debt load. This partial IPO valued the company at much less than the LBO price, reflecting the market’s recognition that RJR was now a highly leveraged, lower-growth enterprise. Even so, it provided a lifeline of cash. Over the next several years, RJR Nabisco gradually stabilized. Under Louis Gerstner’s leadership, the company focused on its strongest core businesses (domestic tobacco and branded snacks) and continued to cut costs. Gerstner famously merged the distinct RJR and Nabisco corporate cultures, which had clashed since the 1985 merger, into a more unified operation.
By the late 1990s, RJR Nabisco had significantly reduced its debt ratio and was generating solid, if unspectacular, profits. However, KKR’s long-term plan was not to keep the conglomerate intact indefinitely. In 1999, RJR Nabisco was split apart: the tobacco business (R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.) was separated from the food business (Nabisco Holdings Corp.) into two independent companies. This breakup effectively acknowledged that the original merger’s logic had run its course. KKR and its investor group exited their remaining positions around this time, a decade after the buyout. The pieces of the former RJR Nabisco soon found new homes: In 2000, Philip Morris acquired Nabisco (Foods) for $14.9 billion, folding those brands into what is now Kraft Foods/Mondelez International. And in 2004, R.J. Reynolds (Tobacco) merged with Brown & Williamson (the U.S. arm of British American Tobacco) to form Reynolds American, which later became part of BAT. By the early 2000s, “RJR Nabisco” as a single entity no longer existed.
For KKR’s investors, the RJR Nabisco saga yielded mixed financial results. The sheer size of the deal and the difficulties encountered meant that returns were lower than initially projected. KKR had to inject more equity than planned and hold the investment for longer, which dragged down its internal rate of return. A retrospective analysis by The Wall Street Journal noted that KKR’s return on the RJR Nabisco buyout was underwhelming, with the firm "barely scratching out a single-digit annual return on its $3.1 billion equity investment". This stood in stark contrast to the lofty 30%-plus returns that buyout firms typically sought during the 1980s. Still, KKR managed to eventually recoup its investment through the 1991 public offering and the late-90s breakup transactions. By contrast, the Wall Street advisors who facilitated the deal made out much more handsomely in the short run. The various investment banks collected over $700 million in fees from the RJR deal and its financing – a record payday for the financial sector. Law firms and junk bond underwriters also earned tens of millions each from the multi-sided bidding war and ensuing refinancing. In many ways, the immediate “winners” of the RJR LBO were the advisors and executives who brokered it, while the company itself was left to labour under a heavy debt burden in the following years.
Conclusion: Financial Impact and Lessons from the Deal
The LBO of RJR Nabisco in 1988–89 was a watershed moment in American finance, one whose financial impact and symbolism still resonate. In the short term, the deal delivered mixed fortunes for different stakeholders. RJR’s public stockholders were indisputably big winners – they received a 95% premium over the pre-bid share price (and far more if they bought in the doldrums before the rumours). The buyout thus created a windfall for shareholders, totalling billions in gains. Many executives and bankers involved also profited enormously.
For RJR Nabisco’s new owners and employees, however, the outcomes were far less rosy. The company itself emerged from the LBO laden with debt that would constrain its growth and strategic options for years. As noted, the anticipated efficiencies and improvements largely went towards debt service rather than innovation or expansion. KKR had hoped to prove that a leaner, private RJR could thrive, but the reality was that the firm spent much of the 1990s playing defence – selling assets and cutting costs to avoid default. Ultimately, RJR Nabisco’s breakup a decade later underscored that the grand experiment of combining a tobacco giant with a food giant (and then leveraging it to the hilt) did not fulfil its initial promise. Bondholders who financed the buyout had a bumpy ride as well; some of RJR's junk bonds traded sharply lower in the early 1990s when the company's prospects looked shakier, but in the end, RJR avoided the bankruptcy that sceptics had feared.
More broadly, the RJR Nabisco LBO marked the climax and collapse of an era. It was the largest takeover of the 1980s boom, coming to symbolize the excesses of 1980s Wall Street. According to Andrew Beattie in an Investopedia Article, RJR Nabisco “represented the height of the LBO craze even as it highlighted corporate excesses” – it was “the last big LBO of the decade” before a sudden fall-off. In 1989, shortly after RJR’s buyout, the junk bond market began to implode: Drexel Burnham, the engine of so many LBOs, collapsed amid scandal, and credit for highly leveraged deals dried up. A study made by Kaplan and Stein in 1993 found that of 83 large 1980s LBOs, 11% went bankrupt by 1990 – a much higher failure rate than later buyout waves. RJR narrowly avoided that fate, but its struggles were a cautionary tale. Wall Street and Washington alike took notes. The late 1980s saw increased scrutiny of insider-led buyouts and regulatory changes (for instance, stricter disclosure rules and limits on junk bond-financed takeovers by thrifts) that cooled the LBO frenzy. For several years after RJR Nabisco, multi-billion-dollar LBOs virtually disappeared.
The deal also sparked a national debate on corporate governance and greed. The sheer spectacle of well-heeled executives and buyout kings battling for a company – with rich rewards for the victors, and massive debt left behind – became a defining narrative of the “Decade of Greed.” Barbarians at the Gate, the bestselling 1990 book chronicling the takeover, painted a vivid picture of boardroom intrigue, ego, and avarice. It portrayed Ross Johnson partying on the company jet while plotting to enrich himself, Henry Kravis determined to win at any cost, and a circus of bankers feasting on fees. In one often-quoted passage, Ted Forstmann (the rival bidder) lambasts the junk bond-fuelled raiders as “barbarians” who “create a huge profit for a few by sucking a massive amount of value out of a company, leaving an outsized debt behind”. This critique resonated with a public increasingly uneasy with Wall Street’s power. The RJR saga, and Barbarians at the Gate’s damning portrayal, contributed to a shift in attitudes – corporations adopted more defences against hostile takeovers, and the most egregious corporate excesses were reined in (at least for a time).
In retrospect, the RJR Nabisco LBO taught important lessons to both practitioners and academics. It illustrated that paying too high a price in an LBO can be disastrous, even for a solid company. KKR paid top dollar – arguably more than the intrinsic value – and as a result, the deal’s financial structure left no margin for error. Many 1980s buyouts suffered from overpriced transactions driven by aggressive bidding and optimistic projections. RJR’s case showed how winner’s curse in auctions can hurt even the winners. The deal also raised questions about management ethics and conflicts of interest. Johnson’s attempt to buy the company he ran – effectively profiting from shareholders by leveraging their own company – was sharply criticized. This led to calls for stricter rules on management-led buyouts to ensure independent evaluation (indeed, RJR’s board set a precedent by running a true auction and looking out for other stakeholders). Another lesson was the importance of capital structure and economic conditions: RJR Nabisco’s huge debt was survivable in a boom, but when industry or economy conditions deteriorated, even a franchise as strong as Oreo cookies and Camel cigarettes struggled under the weight of leverage.
In the end, the fate of RJR Nabisco was a sobering counterpoint to the freewheeling optimism of the 1980s LBO boom. Yes, leveraged buyouts can discipline companies and reward investors, but as RJR showed, they can also push a healthy firm to the brink. The RJR Nabisco deal did eventually generate respectable returns for its private equity backers, but not without a decade of restructuring and pain. For many, the legacy of this deal is captured in the dramatic narrative of Barbarians at the Gate, which remains a staple in business schools. Its enduring lesson is a reminder that corporate takeovers are not just numbers on a spreadsheet, but human dramas – complete with ambition, risk, excess, and, ultimately, accountability. RJR Nabisco’s LBO stands as the defining story of an era, a cautionary tale of how far the pursuit of value (and wealth) can go, and what it can leave in its wake.
References
Academic Papers and Case Studies
Michel, A., & Shaked, I. (1991). RJR Nabisco: A case study of a complex leveraged buyout. Financial Analysts Journal, 47(5), 15-27. Retrieved from (https://people.bath.ac.uk/mnsrf/Teaching%202011/RJR%20case%20study.pdf)
Femino, L. (2015). Ex ante review of leveraged buyouts. Yale Law Journal, 124(6), 1756-1799. Retrieved from (https://www.yalelawjournal.org/note/ex-ante-review-of-leveraged-buyouts)
Washington & Lee Law Review. (1991). Corporate governance and conflicts of interest in management-led buyouts: Lessons from RJR Nabisco. Retrieved from (https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3001&context=wlulr)
Books
Burrough, B., & Helyar, J. (1990). Barbarians at the Gate: The Fall of RJR Nabisco. Harper & Row.
News Articles, Analyses and Financial Journalism
Beattie, A. (2023, July 17). Corporate Kleptocracy at RJR Nabisco. Investopedia. Retrieved from (https://www.investopedia.com/articles/stocks/09/corporate-kleptocracy-rjr-nabisco.asp)
Paltrow, S. J. (1990, January 28). The biggest deal of all time... Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from (https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-01-28-bk-1363-story.html)
The Wall Street Journal. (1988-1989). Coverage of the RJR Nabisco takeover and bidding war. Retrieved from (https://www.wsj.com)
The New York Times. (1989). RJR Nabisco’s buyout and aftermath: Corporate finance in the 1980s.Retrieved from (https://www.nytimes.com)
Saporito, B. (1989, April 24). How Ross Johnson blew the buyout. Fortune. (as cited in Investopedia)
Time Magazine. (1988, December 5). Cover: “A Game of Greed” (Ross Johnson profile). Retrieved from (https://content.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19881205,00.html)
Alchetron. (n.d.). F. Ross Johnson - Biography and Image. Retrieved from (https://alchetron.com/F-Ross-Johnson.)
Gara, A., & Vandevelde, M. (2021, October 11). Henry Kravis and George Roberts hand over transformed KKR. Financial Times. Retrieved from (https://www.ft.com/content/f75f50e7-381f-4c95-9e0f-25e32f70662d)
BSPE Club. (2021). The LBO of RJR Nabisco: How has private equity evolved since the 1980s?Retrieved from (https://bspeclub.com/the-lbo-of-rjr-nabisco-how-has-private-equity-evolved-since-the-1980s)
Historical and Financial Data
Federal Reserve Board. (1989). Report on leveraged buyouts and junk bond markets. Retrieved from (https://www.federalreserve.gov)
Crawford’s World. (2018). Takeover flowchart: The RJR Nabisco bidding process. Retrieved from (https://crawfordsworld.com/rob/economics/EconBarbarians/barbariansFlowchartr.htm)
RJR Nabisco. (1988). Proxy Statement and Prospectus (Dec 6, 1988). Retrieved from (https://archive.org/details/nationalbiscuitcompanynabiscoannualreports)
United Press International (UPI). (1989, January 30). RJR Nabisco reports earnings. UPI. Retrieved from (https://www.upi.com/Archives/1989/01/30/RJR-Nabisco-reports-earnings/2642602139600/)
Other Case Documents and Reports
Michel & Shaked. (1991). RJR Nabisco: A case study of a complex leveraged buyout. Retrieved from (https://staff.bath.ac.uk/mnsrf/Teaching%202011/RJR%20case%20study.pdf)
Scribd Report on RJR Nabisco LBO. (Archived). Retrieved from (https://fr.scribd.com)
ScholarlyCommons Law Review. (1991). Leveraged buyouts: Lessons from the RJR Nabisco deal.Retrieved from (https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu)
-
Written by Hippolyte Metzger-Otthoffer
Comments